NOT that I agree with this view, but this is something sort of interesting I found. It's just interesting to learn of this point of view, whereby academics etc take the view that it is not Dalai Lama's policies that are harmful but the "exclusivistic" politics/policies of the Gelugpas themselves which is causing the conflict. Pish, I say. In that case, the same could be said of any other sect or school of Buddhism that chooses to focus "exclusively" on the teachings within their school. Ironic too really - as A Friend has pointed out - since the very basis and strength of Gelug teachings is the fact that they are the combined, synthesised essence of all three schools.
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According to Kay, “whilst the conservative elements of the Gelug monastic establishment have often resented the inclusive and impartial policies of the Dalai Lamas towards revival Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Dalai Lama has in turn rejected exclusivism on the grounds of that encourages sectarian disunity and thereby harms the interests of the Tibetan state.” Thus the Dalai Lamas have spoken out against what he saw as spiritually harmful as well as nationally damaging. Especially during Tibet’s present political circumstance, the present Dalai Lama felt the urge to speak against Dorje Shugden practice. In sum the Dalai Lama’s main criticisms of Shugden practice is that the "practice fosters religious intolerance and harms the Tibetan cause and unity".
There are different political interpretations of that conflict.
In the context of the Tibetan history Kay states: "The political policies of the Dalai Lamas have also been informed by this inclusive orientation. It can be discerned, for example, in the Great Fifth's (1617-82) leniency and tolerance towards opposing factions and traditions following the establishment of Gelug hegemony over Tibet in 1642; in the Great Thirteenth's (1876-1933) modernist-leaning reforms, which attempted to turn Tibet into a modern state through the assimilation of foreign ideas and institutions (such as an efficient standing army and Western-style education); and in the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's promotion of egalitarian principles and attempts to 'Maintain good relations among the various traditions of Tibetan religion in exile' (Samuel 1993: 550).
This inclusive approach has, however, repeatedly met opposition from others within the Gelug tradition whose orientation has been more exclusive. The tolerant and eclectic bent of the Fifth Dalai Lama, for example, was strongly opposed by the more conservative segment of the Gelug tradition. These 'fanatic and vociferous Gelug churchmen' (Smith 1970: 16) were outraged by the support he gave to Nyingma monasteries, and their 'bigoted conviction of the truth of their own faith' (Smith 1970: 21) led them to suppress the treatises composed by more inclusively orientated Gelug lamas who betrayed Nyingma, or other non-Gelug, influences. Similary, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's political reforms were thwarted by the conservative element of the monastic segment which feared that modernisation and change would erode its economic base and the religious basis of the state. His spiritually inclusive approach was also rejected by contemporaries such as Pabongkha Rinpoche (1878-1943)
As with his predecessors, the current Dalai Lama's open and ecumenical approach to religious practice and his policy of representing the interests of all Tibetans equally, irrespective of their particular traditional affiliation, has been opposed by disgruntled Gelug adherents of a more exclusive orientation. This classical inclusive/exclusive division has largely been articulated within the exiled Tibetan Buddhist community through a dispute concerning the status and nature of the protective deity Dorje Shugden.”
Another view looking to the present situation is: “it has been suggested that the Dalai Lama, in rejecting Dorje Shugden, is speaking out against a particular quasi-political factions within the Gelug tradition-in-exile who are opposed to his modern, ecumenical and democratic political vision, and who believe that the Tibetan government” “should champion a fundamentalist version of Tibetan Buddhism as a state religion in which the dogmas of the Nyingmapa, Kagyupa, and Sakyapa schools are heterodox and discredited.” According to this interpretation, Dorje Shugden has become a political symbol for this “religious fundamentalist party”. From this point of view, the rejection of Dorje Shugden should be interpreted "not as an attempt to stamp out a religious practice he disagrees with, but as a political statement". According to Sparham: "He has to say he opposes a religious practice in order to say clearly that he wants to guarantee to all Tibetans an equal right to religious freedom and political equality in a future Tibet."
Dreyfus argues that although the political dimension forms an important part of that dispute it does not provide an adequate explanation for it. He traces back the conflict more on the exclusive/inclusive approach and maintains that to understand the Dalai Lama’s point of view one has to consider the complex ritual basis for the institution of the Dalai Lamas, which was developed by the Great Fifth and rests upon "an eclectic religious basis in which elements associated with the Nyingma tradition combine with an overall Gelug orientation". This involves the promotion and practices of the Nyingma school. The 5th Dalai Lama was criticized by and was treated in a hostile manner by conservative elements of the Gelug monastic establishment for doing this and for supporting Nyingma practitioners. The same happened when the 14th Dalai Lama started to encourage the devotion to Padmasambhava, central to the Nyingmas, and when he introduced Nyingma rituals at his personal Namgyal Monastery (Dharmasala, India). Whilst the 14th Dalai Lama started to encourage the devotion to Padmasambhava for the purpose of unifying the Tibetans and "to protect Tibetans from danger", the "more exclusively orientated segments of the Gelug boycotted the ceremonies", and in that context the sectarian Yellow Book was published.
